COMMENTARY
The Role of CUBs in the
Reclamation of
American Government
by Robert C. Fellmeth

Political scientists now describe the
American system of government as a
"pluralistic model." Although somewhat
obtuse, the term acknowledges that the
civics model we studied in ninth grade
has yielded to a "mixed" system. That is,
the purity of constitutional democracy
has been influenced by unofficial actors,
including political parties, private interests, and entrenched bureaucracies.
While many of these additions to the
American three-branch design may well
be benign, the increasing power of those
organized around a narrow profit stake
in public policies increasingly presents a
threat of malignant character.
Some political theorists have foolishly rationalized that private organized
influence simply represents "intensity of
interest" entitled to greater weight than
would be produced by the strict application of one person-one vote democracy.
The problem with this conclusion is its
failure to consider that there are many
different kinds of intensely held interests, and that those which are now dominant represent intensity of economic
interest in the here and now. Current
apologists discount the fundamental ethical call of humankind to represent a set
of diffuse interests-diffuse but nevertheless entitled to intensity of consideration: the concerns of consumers at large,
the helpless and unorganized, and the
future we leave to our legatees through
the millennia to come.
The representation of the broad and
long-term public interest is a vision
America's founders expected our public
officials to carry with them, and to guide
them as they pondered the merits-and
only the merits-of the issues which are
the subjects of their official deliberations. To the extent those with such a
public charge delegate their powers to
those whose concern is narrow, pecuniary, self-interested, and temporal, that
vision is betrayed.
The most unsettling form of private
interest contamination is borne through
private trade association and political
action committee (PAC) influence of
state officials. It is now a consensus
judgment in the most arcane towers of
academia: the three branches, constitu-

ie California Regulatory Law Reporter

tionally checking each other as they
make public decisions in the perceived
interests of the general citizenry, are no
longer the determinants of American
public policy. Rather, private interest
groups have an influence substantially
greater than was countenanced in our
constitutional design.
How did we create an overlay of private influence to circumvent our traditional values of public control of public
institutions? What are the implications
of that creation? The answer is complicated, and disturbing to those who maintain some reverence for the principles of
Jefferson and Adams.
Trend #1: The Horizontalization of
America. Three trends in recent history
particularly threaten the sustenance of
democratic values. First, we have
become a horizontalized society. There
was a time when we related to each other
more intimately in a vertical format:
doctors identified with their patients,
attorneys with their clients, businesses
with their customers. We were a nation
of small and for the most part independent entrepreneurs, subject to marketplace discipline. Increasingly, we have
become a nation of employees, large
corporate farms, factories, and, at the
retail level, chains. In most industries
and trades, we have organized around
our occupational grouping. We now
identify with our trade or professional
peers. We have formed trade associations by the thousands. We are organized
as never before in history along horizontal lines--each occupation with its own
association, separate bureaucracy, and
political action program.
The horizontalization that has
occurred has been facilitated by strong
support for its political manifestation-the now ubiquitous PACs. Normally, where competitors at the same
level of production (such as physicians,
or oil companies, or auto dealers, or
banks) meet and discuss any subject,
they are subject to strict scrutiny and
limitations. They are by definition a
"conspiracy or combination" under state
and federal antitrust law. Competitors
are supposed to compete, not cooperate.
Cooperation undermines democracy
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and, instead of the consumer determining the marketplace by choosing
between different products, the producers can determine (at least in the short
run) the marketplace by limiting what is
offered by private agreement. Such
agreements can be to limit supply, not
produce a product, not deal with another
entity, allocate bids or territories, or fix
prices. Such agreements are most likely
to restrain trade, and constitute a felony
offense.
But the most serious of these
restraints-horizontal price fixing
-seems to have an exception. In an
abuse of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 1 trade associations believe that
they may in fact fix prices horizontally at
higher levels if they use the proceeds for
purposes of political influence. Where a
trade association representing the brunt
of a market for a product or service so
assesses its membership, the monies
raised for its own political purposes do
not come from the stockholders who
own the enterprises and for whose benefit they are raised. Rather, applied industrywide, the assessment acts as an indirect tax on the consumers of that
industry. Hence, when the insurance
industry wanted to raise money for 1988
political initiative campaigns in California, it raised over $60 million dollars by
agreeing to assess itself 1% of the premiums collected the prior year. This assessment was passed on to the public, which
paid the bill-more than the amount
spent by either national party on the
presidential campaign in that same year.
It cost the insurance industry little or
nothing. Hundreds of associations have
this kind of pass-through quasi-public
power-the ability to assess the public
huge sums using cartel arrangement and
antitrust exemption, often in order to
mislead the public, abuse its interests,
and undermine the integrity of its government.
Trend #2: The Corruptive Influence of Political Money. The second
troubling trend has been the influence of
money on the making of public decisions. Certainly the problem of bribery
remains, accentuated by the tendering of
job offers to public officials while still in
public employ, and the common offer of
honoraria for speaking-which, for
much of the nation, can consist of three
minutes of ringing oratory at a breakfast
meeting with the three lobbyists of the
benefactor PAC. But much more
troubling is the influence of campaign
contributions. At present, for example,
California has no limitations on campaign spending or campaign contributions except for a limited number of
local races. One PAC can give $500,000
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to a single candidate. Exacerbating this
problem are newly-enacted state office
term limits which require huge campaign funds by public officials who need
to move to new seats and challenge
those incumbents, who in turn must raise
large war chests for defense.
Trend #3: The Growth of the Regulatory-Industrial Complex. The third
recent dynamic is the growth of regulatory agencies. These agencies have been
created by legislative act in substantial
numbers-California now has over 200.
Regulatory boards and commissions
now "license" or regulate most of the
economy of the state. They determine
who can and who cannot practice a trade
or profession-ranging from barbers and
contractors to physicians and attorneys.
They determine the state of our environment-the future of the land and water
of the state, the heritage we shall leave
our progeny. And they regulate our
financial institutions and our utilities.
The regulation of financial institutions carries with it the particularly
important determination of our basic
financial health as a society: the flow of
capital for new investment, the supply of
credit for consumer purchases of autos,
appliances, and homes. These institutions operate under restricted conditions
of competition, and often in an adhesive
manner vis-a-vis consumers-through
the use of standardized contracts and the
unilateral determination of late charges,
balloon payments, prepayment penalties,
etc. The financial industry's regulation
has included unusual protection financed
by public resources: the assessment of
fees for publicly arranged insurance
(fees which are assessed industrywide
and passed through to consumers as an
indirect tax); and by general fund taxpayer backstop.
In general, these regulatory agencies
operate without close examination by
legislatures and journalists, and substantially out of the public light. They are
often governed by officials with immediate economic conflicts of interest as to
the public policies they are empowered
to decide. Most of them are current practitioners of the very trade or participants
in the very industry they are charged to
restrain in the public interest. Hence, not
only are the regulatory agencies administered by persons often appointed by
officials subject to campaign contribution influence, and governed by boards
responsive to the same corrupting
dynamic, but they consist of persons
presently practicing in the trade or
industry allegedly regulated for the protection of the broad public. Decisions are
subject to the political power of the
PACs, stimulated by job offers, and aug-

mented by actual industry investiture as
public officials.
Regulatory agencies operate under
very general enabling statutes and are
given broad authority to legislate
through rulemaking. They have the power to define the requirements to engage
in a business or trade, and specify what
is and is not a violation of law. And they
act as courts to discipline administratively those who violate state law or their
rules, including the power to fine and
expel licensees from their chosen occupation. Unlike formal judicial proceedings, however, these officials are permitted to engage in private or ex parte
communications about pending rules or
cases with persons who are parties to or
interested financially in the outcome.
Their decisions are subject to court
review, but courts now substantially
defer to their judgments on matters of
substance.
A regulatory agency operates formally as a neutral legislator or judge, compelled to weigh two conflicting interests:
the likely public-protection spirit of its
enabling legislation, versus the constitutional requirement not to "take" contrary
to law. That is, an agency may not
deprive a regulated entity of property or
limit its rights without due process and
perhaps without just compensation. This
is the setting for the momentous decisions made by regulatory agencies. In
this context, and quite apart from the
identity of the decisionmakers, the
imbalance of advocacy before the agency exacerbates the distortion. As noted,
those with an immediate profit stake
have almost unlimited financial
resources for purposes of advocacy, and
they dominate in state regulatory proceedings. The balance is tilted against
the broad interests of society-that is,
consumers in general, taxpayers, the
environment, the weak and dispossessed,
children, and the future. In these agencies, influence by those organized to
keep or to take for their immediate financial gratification is most manifest.
Confronting the Systemic
Breakdown: The Options
The dilemma which confronts our
democracy on a basic level is how to
deal with the forces undermining democratic responsiveness; how to restore and
preserve the proper concern for broader
interests; how to check the excessive
influence of groups with immediate
financial goals; and how to bring a balance of advocacy before the tribunals
determining important public policy.
This is the political reality of the last
decade of the twentieth century.

Option #1: Atomize. There are three
basic approaches to rectifying the current dangers. The first is to atomize the
excessive horizontal organization for
political purposes by limiting campaign
contributions, reversing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine which arguably permits
industry to tax consumers to finance
political activities, or applying antitrust
principles. We recognize the right of
each individual to engage in private
business, but we enforce antitrust law to
preclude collusion which undermines the
economic democracy of a marketplace
responsive to general consumer demand,
determined from the bottom up by individual purchasing preferences. There is
no divine law preventing us from applying this same rule to the political arena:
you can do whatever you want as an
individual, but we are limiting your right
to act politically as an organized commercial entity.
However attractive this first option
may be to utopia aficionados, it suffers
from serious defects, including properly
revered counter-values respecting the
rights of political association. However,
options two and three are worthy of serious consideration.
Option #2: Create an Independent
State Which Makes Decisions on the
Merits. The second tactic is to create an
informed and fairly balanced political
state-by assuring that there is a wall of
integrity between those making decisions
on our behalf and those with a
profit-stake
interest seeking to influence
them. We accomplish this reform
through the public financing of campaigns; the prohibition of all private honoraria, gifts, gratuities, and future
employment from private groups to public officials; and by requiring public officials themselves to have no vested profit
stake in the policies they decide for the
general weal. To the extent expertise is
needed, adequate and equally independent agency staffs properly provide it.
And we assure balanced advocacy
between groups with narrow, pecuniary
interests and groups with broader interests.
Option #3: Organize the Diffuse
and Dispossessed to Counterbalance.
The third tactic is to organize more general interests to counterbalance the intensive organization of those easily coalesced around a profit stake. This tactic
comports with the widespread-and perhaps regrettable-acceptance of the
"pluralistic" model by political scholars.
It has the advantage of fitting into the
current societal ground rules of advocacy and influence. Most important, it
satisfies the primal tenet of social
change: never try to take anything away
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from anybody. It is easier to not give
someone something than to take it away
after it has been given. Stated more
pointedly, it is easier to add another actor
to the play than to cut the parts of those
who have learned their parts and have
been profiting from them for many
years.
CUBs: Ninth-Grade Civics
Brought to Life
In this setting, the concept of citizens' utility boards (CUBs) is ingenious.
It does not cost the taxpayer money. It
does not subtract or directly challenge
the political rights of any group. It simply facilitates the horizontal organization of those otherwise not in the
script-those whose interests are most
seriously underrepresented. It responds
to the American instinct to let people
organize and participate; to allow someone in; to provide balance and fairness to
a legislative or judicial proceeding.
The CUB option partially addresses
two of the three remedial strategies most
capable of successful actualization. It
provides more balanced advocacy in
,regulatory proceedings themselves-a
kind of technical equity making the
results more legitimate in terms of due
process concepts. And it creates a political entity by horizontally organizing
those who lack formal representation in
the influence of public officials. To the
extent political scientists correctly view
such public officials as driven in vectorlike fashion by their sources of influence, such political organization is
essential. The CUB concept recognizes
the reality that even if one were to succeed in accomplishing the second tactic
of creating a wall of integrity so that the
state made decisions on the merits of the
issues, it would still be necessary to
counterbalance advocacy before those
neutral decisionmakers. Even where the
decisionmaker is well-intentioned and
deliberating on the merits, information
and advocacy are also power and will
often determine the result.
CUBs have begun to organize in a
most propitious forum warranting their
presence: the public utility commissions
(or public service commissions) which
regulate monopoly utilities. Here, the
political power of those with a vested
profit stake (the utilities) is momentous
in terms of campaign contributions and
often the selection of the regulators
themselves. .Legal and advocacy
resources are even more egregiously
imbalanced. The utilities are able to
assess the costs of their legal advocacy
from the ratepayers. This cost is considered by law a virtually automatic "pru-
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dent expense" passed through for direct
consumer assessment-even where
incurred at extremely high levels. Expert
witnesses, in-house and retained counsel, and the use of utility staff give these
entities an overwhelming advantage in
any'rulemaking or ratesetting proceeding. There are few limits on what can be
spent, and those in whose interests the
advocacy is advanced-the stockholders
of the company-pay for little or none of
it.
Utility regulators have an explicit
constitutionally imposed duty to provide
a fair rate of return to utility stockholders, which must be neutrally balanced
against ratepayer, environmental, and
other interests. The regulator is not a
consumer advocate and is not permitted
to impose a tyranny of the majority on
the legitimate property rights of utility
(or other) investors. Even where the regulator seeks to create an internal and separate staff role to accomplish ratepayer
representation, the regulator remains an
inadequate proxy for advocacy on behalf
of the many. On a theoretical level, the
agency staff is too politically removed
from the direct control of the general
constituency; on the practical level, the
staff normally is not free to appeal to the
courts a decision of the agency within
which it operates. A CUB structure
directly controlled by and responsible to
ratepayers is capable of more legitimate
representation of ratepayer interests, and
only it is capable of assuring that balanced advocacy extends to court review,
where precedents dictating standards and
procedures of special import may be
decided.
What CUBs ask for is nothing less
than societal ground rules to facilitate
what we claim to be our most cherished
birthright-to organize, to contribute
voluntarily, to discuss social issues, to
provide helpful information to public
officials, to counterbalance governmental proceedings dominated by one group
at the expense of a larger group whose
interests form the raison d'etre of the
forum itself.
CUBs ask that public assets be made
available simply so that citizens can
communicate one to the other for these
purposes; so they may establish private
democratic institutions to enrich public
democratic institutions, to the detriment
of no one-except to the extent "detriment" consists of additional evidence
and arguments to inhibit imbalanced and
unfair rules and adjudications.
Our political, corporate, securities,
and commercial laws allow for the organization, legal recognition, and-in
many respects-the public subsidy of
those organized around their direct and
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immediate financial concerns. Laws give
individuals immunity from personal civil
liability where corporations are formed,
and confer numerous tax advantages on
various commercial forms of organization-from limited partnerships to real
estate syndications. There is no "natural
order" to these societal ground rules;
they represent policy choices about facilitating human organization for beneficial
purposes. Adjusting our laws and rules
to facilitate the organization of those
underrepresented and excluded interests
creates no radical precedent-even if the
form of such stimulation may be different. Encouraging the general public to
organize creates a defensible "pluralism"-where the whole plurality is
included. Where generalized interests
are present and strong, government by
self-interested trade-offs of those immediately profiting is counterbalanced.
As Beth Givens' CUB study establishes, CUBs are not merely capable of
performing such a function. They have
proven themselves on four separate
fields of encounter: Wisconsin, San
Diego, Illinois and Oregon. CUBs have,
at no expense to any citizen who does
not wish to participate, influenced public
decisions to limit what would otherwise
be monopoly excesses by many billions
of dollars, hundreds of times more in
amount than their total cost to those voluntarily contributing. Nor has their
impact been confined to rates. In a single
contested case, the San Diego CUB
(UCAN) was a primary litigator successfully halting what would have been the
largest utility merger in United States
history. The 1991 decision of the California Public Utilities Commission
rejecting the merger found its direct and
indirect social costs to be staggering-a
decision to reject which few had anticipated at the outset of the request, and
one attributable substantially to CUB
advocacy and its ability to organize
thousands of ratepayers around the issue.
Moreover, as Givens' study implies,
the CUB model may well be properly
extended into other industries such as
insurance and finance, where analogous
abuses addressed by CUBs are equally
capable of amelioration by application of
the CUB concept. What would have
been the course of the savings and loan
debacle had federal and state regulators
been forced into open and informed
examination of the practices of those
regulated and the implications of their
own policies on the public weal? We
believe that the CUB concept addresses
the underlying modern infirmity in
the American governmental structure,
and that it certainly would have made a
difference in our financial institution
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crisis, where our contentions about
secret and industry-solicitous proceedings of regulatory agencies are particularly applicable. The hundreds of billions of dollars in public resources lost
through this single series of unforgivable
blunders could have ended world
hunger, and substantially reclaimed the
earth from its now-dominant human
predators in the bargain.
The CUB model is an allegory for
what ails the body politic in general.
And it is also the antidote-an elixir of
citizen energy, based on three age-old
repositories of American value: fair play,
balance, and the right of all of us to be
heard---even the majority.

FOOTNOTE
1. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine
allows competitors to combine and
restrain trade-where undertaken for
purposes of political advocacy before
government. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct.
523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85
S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965).
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